Why did the central powers lose the war?

Although rarely identified Germany was close to victory in 1918. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia at the end of 1917 resulted in a ceasefire in December of 1917 on the eastern front. Russia, looking for peace at every cost, after months of negotiation, signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, losing a third of its territory (and three-quarters of its coal and iron) to Germany. The peace treaty achieved what the Schlieffen plan had failed to accomplish years before; a war on one front only. Hindenburg (the rock), and Ludendorff (the brain), achieved a 10 percent superiority over the allied forces on the western front by moving a third of its eastern forces (500,000 men) to aid the war efforts on the west. However, deep domestic concerns in the central powers, a failure in looking for strong allies and thoughtless leadership and unclear war aims meant that the passing of the Germans at the Hindenburg line on march 21st with victory at sight (at the launch of the Kaiserschlacht) turned into a bitter retreat. Resulting in the German forces passing the Hindenburg line again on August 8th; only this time beaten.

Immediately after the start of the war the British, due to their superior sea power, installed a naval blockade on the central powers. The blockade stopped most trade through the North Sea (Germany’s only direct access to the ocean) and caused a devastating effect on resources available to the central powers. The effect of the blockade on Germany was strongly identified after the devastating “turnip winter” of 1916 (Since turnips was the only food available to German citizens this catastrophic time bears the name of the vegetable). In 1916 Bulgarian and Austria- Hungarian were also suffering from the food shortages and their constraint to consuming ersatz products only. The food shortages did not only fuel riots and social unrest in Germany, but also in the other Central powers and protests in large cities such as Vienna and Budapest became commonplace. The social protests in Germany were further intensified when the “Hindenburg Programme”, (a law that increased the focus of labor on war efforts) was put into effect. In the actual bill that Hindenburg was able to pass to become a law he states: “we can only win the war if we supply the army with enough military equipment that it confronts the enemy armies from a position of equal strength, and if we secure adequate food supplies for our entire population. Given that our enemies have richer resources; this goal is possible only if everything that our country has in natural resources, everything that industry and agriculture can produce, is utilized exclusively in prosecuting the war.” While at the time unidentifiable the Wilsonian ideas of Hindenburg seemed close to impossible when referring to the “adequate food supplies” for all of Germany’s citizens and, ipso-facto, many people identified the law for what it was; a silent control of the country by the military. This ‘silent dictatorship’ by the army’s leadership and top industrialists in Germany meant that food for citizens was the in very short supply. Due to this strikes became commonplace in key industries and the revolutionary Social Democratic Party was agitating for an end of the war. National unrest and revolutionary ideas coming from Russia not only made the citizens of Germany more critical, but also demoralized it’s army to a decisive extent.

The alliances formed before and during the war were also of immense consequence to the outcome of the war for Germany and the central powers. The never-ending search for allies during world war one turned into a battle fought by diplomats, that in retrospective had more importance to the overall outcome than many battles fought by soldiers. The original triple entente turned into a much larger coalition which included forces from as far away as Japan and European nations such as Romania, Greece, Serbia and Italy (who joined the allies in 1915 although they belonged to the central powers.) Furthermore, the British empire was also represented by armies from their colonies such as Australia, New Zealand and even Canada. The central powers on the other hand lacked associates. Not only did the original triple alliance (an agreement between Italy, Austria-Hungary and Germany) loose a member in 1915, but the union had not only less members when compared to the allied powers, they were also economically and morally weaker. The only true members of the central powers in addition to the triple alliance were Bulgaria and the ottoman empire. The ottoman empire did turn into a crucial part of the alliance after the Gallipoli campaign launched by Britain on the 25th of April, 1915. However, the bright military accomplishments of the ottoman empire were shadowed by the genocidal events domestically and the belief of Germany that ottoman leadership was being close to subordinate when making military decisions. Furthermore, the early surrender of Bulgaria in September of 1918 undermined the cause of the central powers due to Austria-Hungary being left defenseless. Nevertheless, the largest determinant on the outcome of the war is the contribution to the allies’ side by the USA. It can be said that the very decision to join the allies unified cause was a product of Germany’s peculiar search for associates. In the so called “Zimmerman telegram” Germany directly tried to eliminate the threat of America by asking Mexico to attack the land that they claimed their own, with weapons and resources supplied by the central powers. The failure of the telegram only resulted in German’s fear of America’s involvement being fulfilled and giving the allies the weight to change the balance. The American’s were able to supply the allies not only with numbers of men and supply but also replenished the soldier’s disheartened morale. The battle for associates was one won by the allied forces; meaning yet another defeat for the central powers.

The Central powers’ lack of union in its leadership was also a decisive factor for their defeat. The leadership had flaws not only in the German military on the western front itself, but also in their guidance on the other central powers. The Germans gained major influence in the ottoman empire’s leadership by establishing military “training programs” and by having the “Asien-korps” and their respective heads such as Freiheer von der Goltz and General Liman von Sanders giving military consulting and advice. Although the bridge of communication between the two militaries evidently existed, the distances at the time need to be taken into account. The failing in completing the Baghdad railway (a project started in 1903 and financed by the German empire) resulted in communication and transportation between Berlin and Baghdad being slow and limited. This led to the orders in the form of “advice” to not always be received by the ottoman empire and there being miscommunications. Furthermore, the German army also had internal conflicts in its leadership. The fault can mainly be identified in Ludendorff’s never ending pursue of French territory. After having launched the Kaiserschlacht on March 21st the Germans were able to conquer undefended French land with ease. They even came as close to Paris as to be able to shell the capital with “big bertha” guns (a type of super-heavy siege artillery). However, the motto of German architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe “less is more”, was not a concept understood by another architect; Ludendorff the designer of German military strategies. His determination to gain further land and support further German advances had a devastating effect on the supply lines. The distance between the supply lines and the most advanced soldiers was so vast that communication from commander and chief lost their authority on their soldiers to the extent that most of them gave themselves into the pleasure of alcohol after having been fighting for months without a break. This although seemingly minor than other events, had a huge effect on the perception of the soldiers and the true purpose for which they were fighting. Leadership or in a way the lack of leadership was a massive foundation for the defeat of the central powers. Not only was the communication between the countries not sufficient to create a unified leadership, but even internally the heads of the German military lacked vision of the bigger picture.

Although at the end of the war Germany and her allies had been beaten quite clearly, there are definite identifiable mistakes that caused the outcome of the war to be so well-defined. The defeat not only of Germany, but of the central powers as a whole, was a product of domestic issues due to the scarcity of food and the focus of the government on the military, the combat fought off the battlefield by diplomats in the search for allies, and most importantly the lack of astuteness in the leadership.